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Abstract
Indonesia is a plural society that consists of several hundred ethnic and sub-
ethnic groups. One of its generic characteristics is heterogeneity. In the last 
ten years after the implementation of regional autonomy, we have witnessed 
the emergence of strong ethnic and religiously flavoured local identity politics 
in various places in Indonesia that created open and vicious conflicts. This 
periodical violence exploded especially during the election of district and 
provincial heads. The intimate relation multiculturalism, with the actual 
political praxis of everyday life as an alternative to the existing paradigm of the 
“homogenization” of nationhood, has not been discussed. I believe it is time to 
discuss the strategic junctures between heterogeneity, politics of ethnicity (and 
religion) and multiculturalism as well as their possible realization at the local 
and national levels in order to find a viable framework for a future Indonesia.  
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Introduction 
In various places in Indonesia over the last ten years after the implementation 
of regional autonomy (Law No.22/1999 and No.32/2000), we witnessed the 
emergence of local identity politics that had a strong ethnic and religious 
flavour. This created open and violent conflicts at the community level that 
exploded from time to time. The clashes between Muslims and Christians 
in Maluku (1999/2001) and Poso (2001) are only two examples. Today we 
continue to hear that people purposely exploit ethnic and religious sentiments 
for political mobilization, particularly during the election of district and 
provincial heads, even though the intensity of this form of exploitation is now 
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much less felt than in the beginning of the Reformasi era.
All this indicates that ethnic and religious issues remain important. 
Unfortunately, its significance has been undermined by a deeply seated fear 
that the regional rebellions of the 1950s -- which were based on ethnic and 
religious differences -- might be repeated. Instead of properly dealing with 
the issues, the government chooses to suppress them, as did the New Order 
regime, which prohibited public discussions on issues of SARA (Suku, Agama, 
Ras dan Antar-golongan or Ethnic Group, Religion, Race and Inter Group). 
As a result, the people were almost totally unaware of the potential threat 
these issues posed to national integration, until violent conflicts exploded in 
1996/1997 -- such as the Dayak-Madurese and Malay-Madurese bloody clashes 
in Kalimantan -- which showed how big the problem really is. It rocked the 
foundations of peace the New Order regime was believed to have. 
Indonesia is a plural society. The Census of the year 2000 registered more 
than 1000 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups, each group claiming to have its own 
language and culture. As such, heterogeneity is an inherent characteristic 
in Indonesia. However, the New Order government, chose not to consider 
heterogeneity and diversity as part of the nation‘s “natural” character; instead 
they continuously attempted to politically homogenize the people. One attempt 
among them was the decision to limit the number of political parties to three, 
namely Golkar (Golongan Karya - representing the working class), PPP (Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan with the Ka’bah as its symbol - representing Muslim 
groups) and PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - representing nationalists and 
democrats). By so doing, the government marginalized the overwhelming 
number of voices that could not be included in these categories. 
Multiculturalism, as proposed at the end of the New Order’s regime 
as an alternative to the existing “homogenization” paradigm to cultivating 
nationhood has not yet been discussed in close relation with the actual political 
praxis of everyday live. I believe it is now high time to investigate the strategic 
junctures between heterogeneity, politics of ethnicity (and religion), and 
multiculturalism and their possible implementation at the local and national 
levels in order to find a viable framework for the future Indonesia. 
Heterogeneity and the politics of ethnicity 
I believe that plurality is not the same as heterogeneity, although they both 
refer to a society that consists of a number of varying groups. Plurality is 
often used as the antonym of singularity, and in this sense, it emphasizes the 
importance of “numbers”. This is exemplified in the statement that “Indonesia 
consists of more than 1000 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups”. Heterogeneity 
(meaning: diversity) stresses the significance of variation, that is, “Indonesia 
consists of various ethnic groups, namely Sundanese, Javanese, Batak, 
Minangkabau, Buginese, Dayak, Papua, etcetera”. 
We often hear that “Indonesia is a plural society”1, but we rarely talk about 
1  The edited volume of the writings of Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Martin Lukito Sinaga, Siti 
Musdah Mulia, Eric Hiariej, Afinawati, Budiman Sudjatmiko, Yayah Khisbiyah and Tonny D. 
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Indonesian society as heterogeneous. I believe heterogeneity is a useful concept 
in order to understand the relationship between groups that together construct 
Indonesian society, because the relationship is not only based on the size of the 
groups involved, but also by group variation. For example, when we say that 
there are several patterns of relationships between groups in a small Javanese 
town, for example Jepara, we should not relate it only to the number of ethnic 
groups living in the area (Javanese, Arabs, Chinese and others), but also to the 
group variation that exists amongst its population (Muslim Nahdlatul Ulama 
Javanese, Muslim Muhammadiyah Javanese, Muslim Arab Sayyids, Muslim 
Arab non-Sayyids, Christian Chinese, Buddhist Chinese, etcetera). Therefore, 
more types of relationships developed in that town than the actual number 
of ethnic groups, and these types are associated with the group variation. 
Likewise, in Jakarta and other large cities we find a large number of 
ethnic groups living side by side. Almost all ethnic groups of Indonesia are 
represented in Jakarta, some with a few members, and others with large 
numbers. However, the types of relationships that developed are not only 
determined by the minority and majority division (such as Javanese majority 
versus Timorese minority), but also by how different ethnic groups within and 
across socio-economic categories develop their relationships with each other, 
and these categories may include class, educational level, economic status, etc. 
All these categories show how complicated so-called “social relationships” are. 
For the sake of analysis, we may often simplify it, but that does not change 
the fact that our everyday lives are constructed by a web of interactions and 
relationships that vary in intensity and levels of intimacy. This variation is 
what constitutes the concept of heterogeneity as discussed in this section.
The concept of heterogeneity does not work as a “social tool” in itself, it 
becomes politically significant only when its various categories are used as 
boundary markers and a “moral and social limitation” for the relationships 
between members of different categories. The caste system in Bali may 
illustrate this situation clearly. The categories of Brahmana, Ksatria, Waisya, 
and Jaba indicate how each group differs from the others, and that the members 
of each category are separated, as well as limited by their category to develop 
Pariela compiled by Ihsan Ali-Fauzi and Samsu Rizal Panggabean (2010), for example, uses 
the word pluralism in its title: Politik identitas dan masa depan pluralisme kita (Politics of identity 
and the future of our pluralism). However, the understanding of the word itself varies. Syafii 
Maarif defines pluralism as keragaman budaya or “cultural diversity” (p. 19). Musdah Mulia 
uses the word to refer to keanekaragaman suku dan agama or the “plurality of ethnic groups and 
religions”, which also means kemajemukan or “plurality”, and this was strengthened by her 
statement that, “adalah sebuah keniscayaan bahwa tidak ada suatu masyarakat pun yang 
benar-benar tunggal, uniter (unitary), tanpa ada unsur-unsur perbedaan di dalamnya” (it is 
a certainty that no society is really single, unitary, without differences in itself) (p. 42). Yayah 
Khisbiyah (p. 81), and Tony Pariela (p. 95) also define pluralism as kemajemukan or “plurality”. 
However, while Khisbiyah sees it as equivalent to multiculturalism (p. 89), Pariela associates 
it with Furnivall’s theory of Indonesia as a “plural society” (p. 96), and with the development 
of pluralism from primordial to liberal and then to consociational, that is pluralism which is 
marked by the transformation of primordialism into effective means for pluralistic democracy 
(p. 98). 
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intense and intimate relationships with other categories. That is why often we 
are told, for example, about forbidden marriages between castes. The use of 
social categories to separate and to limit interaction and relationships between 
people is what we call “the politics of ethnicity”. The result of such politics is 
ethnic domination, which at the same time may produce ethnic discrimination 
toward smaller, weaker, and powerless groups. 
Ethnic domination and discrimination in Indonesia 
The best-known case of ethnic discrimination is that against Chinese 
Indonesians, and many books relate how the New Order government 
politically discriminated them to make it difficult for them to work in 
governmental institutions, and by so doing, forced them to concentrate on 
the private sector and to limit themselves to the economic sector. 
However, we could give many examples of ethnic domination and 
discrimination among indigenous people themselves. For example, it is easy 
to find cases where members of a particular ethnic group occupy a local 
government office, even though various ethnic groups populate the area. 
Not only that; in some areas we find family connections among high-ranking 
officials and among members of legislative bodies at the regional level. The 
latest trend is that while the husband occupies an executive position, the 
wife becomes a member of the legislative body, or vice versa. At first sight, 
this does not constitute “ethnic domination”, but since the governing process 
is exactly the same, that is when a group of people or families dominates 
or controls a particular position or area, they would surely try to maintain 
their dominant position and control through mobilizing, first kinship 
relations, and then ethnic associations, so that the result would certainly be 
ethnic domination and discrimination. Whether they use ethnic affinities or 
kinship relations as tools to select new members to strengthen their group, 
the outcome would be the same that they would also discriminate those 
they consider non-ethnic members and non-kins by categorizing them as 
“unrelated others”, “outsiders”, or even “fierce competitors” and “potential 
opponents”. Moreover, we see this very common picture in local and regional 
governmental institutions around the country. For examples, we may talk 
about Dayak-Chinese-Malay competition in West Kalimantan, or Christian-
Muslim rivalries in Maluku and Poso, as well as “native-son versus migrant” 
in all urban establishments at the provincial and district levels. 
This situation highlights the political significance of ethnic and religious 
issues within the Indonesian nationhood, which undermines the construction 
of Indonesia as satu nusa, satu bangsa dan satu bahasa (one homeland, one 
nation, and one language), as well as what is stated in Chapter 27 of the 1945 
Constitution that segala warga negara bersamaan kedudukannya di dalam hukum 
... (All citizens have an equal position within the law). 
Equality in multiculturalism?
Many people believe that multiculturalism may solve the problem of inequality 
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brought about by ethnic domination and discrimination. Multiculturalism 
--which argues for the celebration of, as well as appreciation and respect 
for diversity-- is seen as the anti-thesis of assimilation, which promotes 
homogeneity and similarity. This is why multiculturalism became the 
preferable alternative for the New Order’s assimilation policy, which failed 
to integrate the people into one unified, Indonesian nation. 
The assimilation policy was introduced in the beginning of the 1970s 
particularly to solve the so-called “Chinese problem” (see Coppel 1983). 
Instead of producing the anticipated results of “harmonizing” the relationships 
between and among ethnic and religious groups in Indonesia, the assimilation 
policy created segregated communities, not only between Chinese and 
Indigenous Indonesians, but also among the indigenous peoples themselves. 
The issues of Javanese versus non-Javanese, of Muslims versus Christians, 
of native-son versus newcomer or migrant, are several indicators of the 
segregation that evolved. Latent conflicts, which had accumulated through 
and by segregation, erupted into violent ethnic and religious riots during the 
1996-2004 periods in West and Central Kalimantan, Maluku, Poso, and other 
places, and these incidents changed people’s perspectives about the benefits 
of the assimilation approach for national integration. Equality-inequality 
became a hot issue to criticize this approach and people who attacked the 
assimilation policy argued that it maintained the existence of “unequal power” 
relations between the majority and minorities by “forcing” minorities to fully 
assimilate into the majority. 
To balance inequality, multiculturalism is believed to have potential, 
because it argues for the protection of the minorities’ rights to run their lives 
as they see fit, and to express themselves freely, both culturally and politically, 
as “equal” counterparts of the majority. 
Unfortunately, multiculturalism does not offer a viable solution for 
the “asymmetrical” construction of minority and majority, which, since its 
inception, contained power imbalance. Under the circumstances, equality 
within the framework of multiculturalism merely amounts to wishful thinking. 
Moreover, as the critics of multiculturalism indicated (see Hoon 2008), 
recognition of minority rights is mostly decorative, because even though 
minorities are able to display their cultural symbols publicly as the celebration 
of their equal status, politically their representatives may still not have the 
power and/or capabilities to effectively influence state policies favourable 
to their interests.
Ethnic factor versus national party system 
Since Indonesia consists of more than 1,000 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups, 
we may safely assume that all these 1,000 cultures and subcultures would 
demand recognition the moment the state declares itself “multicultural”. If our 
calculation is right, or even if it is partially true, we should ask ourselves the 
following question: even though by law the Indonesian government should 
protect the rights of each legally recognized group to maintain, display, and 
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develop its own cultural distinctiveness, would it really be possible for it to 
do so when within that framework the government is obliged to provide the 
financial support entitled to each group due to such recognition? I believe it 
would be a dilemma the authorities would find difficult to solve. 
The situation could become more complicated when state recognition might 
motivate each group to demand the right to its own political representative, 
as well as its own territory, within the state system. These demands would 
be difficult to accommodate as long as the Indonesian political structure 
remains a party system, because within that system, there is no place for 
the ethnic factor and/or the cultural derivatives of ethnicity. Under the law, 
each citizen may become a party member, if they chose to. Therefore, even 
though the state has agreed to, and legally signed the Helsinki Memorandum 
of Understanding that the Acehnese are allowed to have a “local party” or an 
Acehnese party, it does not automatically mean that a non-Acehnese could not 
become a member of that party. Moreover, the national system dictates the 
electoral threshold that, to participate in the elections, a political party must 
have representatives in two-thirds of the country’s 32 provinces, as well as in 
two thirds of the total number of districts within each province. Obviously, 
a local party would be unable to do so.
Multiculturalism in practice
Even as a mere concept, we should treat multiculturalism with caution 
because it does not promote the equality we might hope. As a policy, it is 
more complicated, because we should take into consideration the Indonesian 
political culture and its structure. Considering the ramifications of Indonesian 
political culture, we should certainly reconsider several times before we decide 
to adopt multiculturalism into our national policy in order to promote ethnic 
and racial equality. We should first ask ourselves the following questions: 
Could we allow each ethnic group, for example, as part of their recognized 
rights to have its own “national holiday”? How could we arrange for the 
application of their right to preserve their cultural heritage (such as language 
and customs) within the national educational system? Would it be possible 
to grant the right to self-govern to each and all ethnic groups as stipulated by 
the International Human Rights Convention? 
These questions were raised not to reject multiculturalism outright, 
but to motivate us to reflect on the problems that might arise during the 
implementation of multiculturalism as a policy. Several well-known models 
of multiculturalism have been applied in Malaysia, Canada, and Australia. 
Each has its own benefits and shortages, and they might not be suitable to 
the Indonesian case. According to Nurhafilah Musa (2008: 8), “Malaysia’s 
multiculturalism or cultural pluralism can be defined as each ethnic 
community is allowed to practice its own lifestyle and culture”. However, in 
practice, the Malaysian model of multiculturalism has created an ethnic mosaic 
that places each ethnic (racial) group in its own particular place. The Malays, 
Chinese, and Indians, each have their own “box” the size of which has been 
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predetermined from the outset. The Malays have the biggest box the other two 
groups cannot compete with. It is their “native rights” that gives the Malays 
such a privilege, or what Musa refers to as their “indigenous character”. 
Article 3 of Malaysia’s Federal Constitution states that the religion of the 
Malaysian Federation is Islam; but the same article permits practitioners of 
other religions to follow their faiths. In this respect, Malaysia is clearly quite 
unlike Saudi Arabia, where the public display of any faith other than Islam 
can subject the religious practitioner to censure, ignominy, and punishment. 
Article 11, however, suggests clearly why Islam in Malaysia might perhaps 
best be understood as embodying the principle of primus inter pares, the first 
among equals: Muslims are free to proselytise to adherents of other faiths, but 
non-Muslims by law are forbidden from preaching to Muslims.2
Even though Musa argues that the indigenous character is balanced, 
because “while it gives preference over Islam and Malay, in Malaysia, other 
cultures and religions can be practiced in peace and harmony” (Musa 2008: 
4), the problem is that within the three fixed categories, there is no place for 
hybrids. The children of mixed marriage couples (Indian-Malay, Chinese-
Indian, or Malay-Chinese) have to choose any one of the existing categories, 
although they are uncomfortable with all of them. This model might create 
a bigger problem for hybrids in Indonesia, because there is a much larger 
variation of possible hybrid combinations than in Malaysia, so the question 
is whether we could and should put all the hybrids into one category, and by 
so doing create an identity problem for the people in this category? 
The Canadian model of multiculturalism and bilingualism has granted 
the French-speaking and the English-speaking people equal rights to choose 
their own language of preference. The Official Languages Policy created in 
1969 is a clear indication that the state recognized the language barrier as a 
social marker that culturally separates and divides the Canadians into two 
distinct groups, but firmly asserts that politically each group has equal rights 
as Canadian citizens. It means that the recognition of their cultural rights does 
not give either of them political privilege(s), except for the freedom to choose 
their own language preference. The policy of multiculturalism, which was 
announced in 1971, further established Canada as “the world’s first officially 
multicultural nation” (Geißler 2003). According to Rainer Geißler, “the core 
principle of multicultural Canadian society is ’living together with differences’, 
’living together in diversity’, ’engaging in diversity’,” which is composed of 
the following seven essential elements:
1.  A commitment to migration and to its consequence, to the ethnocultural 
differences and diversity; 
2.  The right of minority women and men to be ethnoculturally different; 
3.  The principle of mutual respect for each other, because all cultures are 
equally valued; 
2  See Vinal Lay 2006.
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4.  The "multicultural assumption" (the social psychology of multiculturalism): 
only those who are secure in their cultural background will be open to 
and tolerant towards others; 
5.  The principle of "unity within diversity": ethnocultural diversity is not 
unlimited; the right to be different and to mutual respect ends when 
differences interfere with core institutional values, with laws, with human 
rights and the rights of individuals; 
6.  Social inclusiveness: equality of opportunities and of participation in 
economic, social cultural and political life for all ethnic groups; 
7.  Active political management: multiculturalism does not develop by itself, 
it needs political promotion.
 These principles, according to Rainer Geißler (2003), are entrenched in the 
Canadian Constitution and in several laws, especially in the Multiculturalism 
Act and the Employment Equity Act. The implementation of these laws is 
supported by a variety of policies and programs such as anti-racism programs, 
employment equity initiatives and immigrant settlement policies. However, 
as Donna Dasko (2003: 8) states, 
[L]arger events outside of the area of language and ethnic diversity can impact 
and affect attitudes and public acceptance[, particularly w]hen the economy 
declines, when our larger institutions are being threatened, and when Canadians 
themselves feel threatened, we see that support for diversity can be challenged.
Therefore, she suggested “to keep the larger institutions strong and stable”, 
because based on the surveys conducted by her institution, Environics 
Research Group Limited, “[b]ilingualism and multiculturalism cannot rely 
on … social values alone, regardless of how supportive these values may 
be”. She believes “a strong economy and institutions that support equality 
of opportunity” are necessary.
Will Kymlicka (2011) also sums up several other important issues. 
First, based on regional reports from Canada, he intimates that “the place 
of religious diversity within multiculturalism has not yet been adequately 
debated or explored”. He argues that “the heated debates around religious 
family law arbitration and the funding of religious schools in Ontario, as 
well as the reasonable accommodation debate in Quebec, [are] now the most 
controversial domain of multiculturalism”. Therefore, he proposes to consider 
“bringing religion into multiculturalism” (p. 11). Second, he talks about the 
role of media in reporting stories because “there have been cases – often of 
opinion editorials – which have been gratuitously offensive or misleading, 
leading to human rights complaints”. Therefore, he argues about the need 
“to rethink how to promote and monitor responsible journalism”. In his 
opinion, “[i]t is right and proper … for hate speech to be a criminal offense; 
it is also right and proper that there be standards of professional conduct for 
journalists, with regulatory bodies and avenues for individuals to complain 
about violations of these standards. But in many cases, what is really required 
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is a broader public debate about editorial policy …” (p. 11). Third, he believes 
that “the issue of how multiculturalism relates to bilingualism, federalism 
and Quebecois nationalism has not been clearly addressed”. There is also 
more work that needs to be done to explain how the federal multiculturalism 
policy and aboriginal rights could work together (p. 12). Fourth, for him, there 
is still a need to ensure that anti-racism and anti-discrimination programs 
are tracking … differentiated and evolving patterns of racialization, such as 
between “victims of racism”, between “visible minorities”, as well as several 
very distinct forms of racialization, such as anti-Black racism, anti-Muslim 
prejudice, because as a matter of fact, “anti-racism initiatives might be working 
well for some groups, even as prejudice is increasing against other groups” (p. 
12). Fifth, the fact that immigrants and the second generation face an “ethnic 
penalty”  —increasing barriers in using their human capital— on the labour 
market in all countries, and as a result form a sort of “underclass”, according 
to him, is not caused by multiculturalism policy. In his opinion, “the causes 
generally lie outside the jurisdiction of the federal multiculturalism policy, 
relating instead to issues such as professional accreditation, the evaluation of 
foreign job experience, language training, and mismatches between immigrant 
selection and actual labour market needs” (p. 13). As a final note, Kymlicka 
(2011: 13) warns that, 
[T]he net result of these trends is neither the utopia celebrated by some defenders 
of multiculturalism, nor the ‘sleepwalking to segregation’ scenario predicted by 
critics. It is rather a complex bundle of factors, each of which needs to be examined 
on its own terms. 
 
The Canadian model might work nicely in Indonesia because we already 
have Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) as our national motto, which 
is quite similar to the Canadian principle that indicates that “ethnocultural 
diversity is not unlimited”. Unfortunately, that is where the similarity ends, 
because we still have to elaborate on the essential elements of such a motto 
as the Canadians have done. Therefore, the model might work only if all 
existing groups in Indonesia could agree to a number of social markers that 
should be used to recognize and distinguish each of them as separate and 
unique cultural entities. Of course, if there were too many social markers to 
be agreed upon it would be more difficult to resolve differences. Considering 
the heterogeneity of the Indonesian population, obviously we could find many 
social markers that could be used for negotiation, from language and tradition 
to cultural symbols and religion. Moreover, Indonesia will have difficulties 
to support a multiculturalism policy because of its “weak” economy (for 
example, Indonesia is still in a very slow recovery process from the 1996-1997 
financial crisis), and its “corrupted” institutions might fail to support equality 
of opportunity which is necessary for multiculturalism to work and persist. 
On the issue of religion, I believe, Indonesia has to work harder to find its 
way of dealing with the problem.
To celebrate multicultural Australia, the Australian government allows 
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each racial group to uphold its cultural uniqueness and to preserve its cultural 
heritage. The following statement (Nicola Henry 2010: 2) clarifies the meaning 
of multiculturalism for Australians:
Multiculturalism represents not a melting pot, but rather ’a voluntary bond of 
dissimilar people sharing a political and institutional structure’ (Australian Ethnic 
Affairs Council). Multicultural strategies include dual citizenship; government 
support for minority newspapers, television and radio; endorsement of cultural 
festivals, holidays and celebrations; acceptance of traditional and religious 
clothing in schools and the military; support for cultural diversity in art and 
literature; programs that support minority representation in politics, education 
and the workforce; and programs designed to encourage greater understanding 
of other cultures.
In drawing their successful stories, some people have highlighted the 
experience of New South Wales, where “multiculturalism is part and parcel of 
government policy”. In this state, “the multicultural principles are enshrined 
in legislation” (p. 8).3 Several indicators used to indicate the success, according 
to Stepan Kerkyasharian A.M. (1998), Chair of Ethnic Affairs Commission of 
NSW, are that, first, “Australia generally has low levels of racial violence and 
discrimination” (p. 6). Second, “[the Australians’] linguistic, cultural and social 
connections are supporting the development of trade links internationally” 
(p. 6). Third, “multiculturalism has contributed to the rich and vibrant cultural 
life in Australia. It has made possible the innovative ’fusion’ approaches to 
theatre, dance, cuisine, and music, which are so often commented on” (p. 7). 
Fourth, the Australians have been able to maintain their social cohesion 
under stress, particularly during the Gulf War of 1991 (p. 6). The underlying 
principle of that success is that “[the Australians] were egalitarian” (p. 9). 
According to Kerkyasharian, “Australia did not adopt the divisive and myopic 
European ‘guest worker’ model - our migrants were not migrants, they were 
Australians from day one” (p. 5). Moreover, there was “bipartisan support 
and a continuum from successive governments”. For example, the Federal 
Government established and funded The Australian Institute of Multicultural 
Affairs, The Office of Multicultural Affairs, and the Bureau of Immigration, 
Multicultural and Population Research (p. 5.), which helped to “create a policy 
framework, a body of literature, a bank of research and a reservoir of expertise 
-- all of those are based on credible impartial academic work -- which made it 
easier to secure institutional recognition and commitment across Government 
to the principles of multiculturalism” (p. 6).
In spite of these successes, several concerns have been expressed. One of 
them concerns the existence of a “Federal Government’s policy which [denies] 
new settlers to this land access to social security benefits - initially for six 
months under the previous Government, and now extended to two years by 
the current Government” (p. 9). Kerkyasharian believes that “[that] policy risks 
3  See Kerkyasharian 1998.
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the creation of a second class of citizens”, which could further “undermine 
[not only] the future of Australian multiculturalism but the stability of [the 
Australian] society itself” (p. 9).
Obviously, like in Canada, all groups in Australia are first (Australian) 
citizens. In multicultural Australia, the emphasis is on equal rights for all 
citizens. Cultural heritage –through the endorsement of cultural festivals, 
holidays and celebrations, as well as the acceptance of traditional and religious 
clothing in schools and the military- is the only social marker employed 
for the recognition of the cultural rights of all (ethnic/racial) groups; even 
though minority representation in politics, education and workforce are also 
encouraged. 
It would be interesting to see whether all ethnic groups in Indonesia, 
together with their government could agree on a particular social marker 
for the recognition of their cultural rights. In the past, the Jakarta Charter 
argument is for religion, namely Islam, to be accepted as the state religion 
and as a legal social marker for Muslims and non-Muslims. However, the 
proposal was rejected, because the majority chose not to have any social marker 
in order to guarantee equal rights for all citizens. Nevertheless, as mentioned 
before, informally the people continue to use every social marker they have 
- namely, ethnicity, religion, birthplace, etcetera - to distinguish “in-group” 
from “out-group” members. As a result, we often see that a particular ethnic 
group successfully dominates a particular political arena, which leads to 
asymmetric control of social and political institutions among various social 
and ethnic groups.
In the light of the ethnic and religious conflicts that took place toward 
the end of Soeharto’s New Order, we could easily assume that ethnicity 
and religion would continue to be Indonesians’ most important social 
markers. Locality which is strongly emphasized after the implementation of 
decentralization and regional autonomy through the issue of “native son”, 
in most cases is intertwined with these two variables (namely, ethnicity and 
religion), socially and politically segregating the community into opposing 
blocks. That is why we find the ethnic-religious pairing of, for example, 
Christian Dayak versus Muslim Malay, or Muslim versus Christian in Ambon 
and Poso. Would it then be possible to establish an ethnic heritage regardless 
of religion and locality as the acceptable social marker for the recognition of the 
cultural rights of all Indonesian ethnic groups? If yes, how should it be done?
Multicultural Indonesia: A proposal
Considering the other countries’ experiences as well as Indonesia’s own 
complex realities, it would be rather problematic to adopt multiculturalism as 
a state policy. However, in the present situation when Indonesia is in transition 
from an authoritarian regime to democratic governance, it is imperative to 
evaluate our future direction in relation to the contemporary problems of 
ethnicity and religion arising from the multicultural characteristics of our 
society. In that case, multiculturalism and multicultural policy are the most 
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practiced concepts known today. Although, in Indonesia, they may not be 
the most suitable practices, the experiences of other countries may provide 
us with clear guidance in how to deal with their limitations, as well as with 
ways to develop new opportunities according to the advantages they might 
be able to offer. 
I have not yet explored them in detail, so it is difficult to make a list 
of all limitations, or reversely, all advantages. It would require a group of 
scholars to do this in a project especially designed to discover the advantages 
and limitations of multiculturalism as applied in various countries. In this 
paper, I would like to call attention to such a requirement. For that purpose, 
I would also like to highlight various important elements in the Indonesian 
context, which should be considered while we evaluate the present problem 
of managing our diversity.
First, our history is a story of interaction between cultures and traditions, 
as well as of hybridism, particularly if we remember how in the past the 
great traditions of China, India, Middle East and the West have met in the 
archipelago and created a rich blend of civilizations, which is uniquely ours. 
Moreover, this is a clear indication that for centuries we have been able to 
manage our diversity well. Of course, we could continue to do so if we wish 
to. Therefore, I believe that, with hybridism as the core principle, we might be 
able to develop a multicultural policy that puts emphasis on such mixtures as 
the benchmark for our future development as a multicultural nation. 
Second, for the Indonesian case, it seems that the most difficult task is to 
make the representatives of all ethnic and religious groups presented in as well 
as accountable for the public policy making process. As discussed above, it is 
impossible to guarantee equality among the various groups in the archipelago 
because there will always be imbalanced relationships between the majority 
and minorities. Perhaps the best way would be not to emphasize the number 
of people who support or reject a particular social, political or cultural issue, 
but to work on solving the issue itself. There are several examples we can use 
to show how these issues have attracted supporters, and how they have been 
successfully implemented public policies over the last twelve years (1999-
2010), namely anti-monopoly, anti-discrimination, new citizenship law, and 
so on. Supporters for these issues came from various fields of life, regardless 
of their ethnicity and religion, which indicates how particular issues can unite 
different groups of people.
Third, the difficulties in applying multiculturalism in Indonesia do not 
generally occur at the level of society, but appear mostly in relation to the state, 
that is as a reflection of conflicting political interests. However, the difficulties 
were often brought into the cultural field creating conflicts between different 
ethnic and cultural groups. They were labelled “cultural”, even though they 
were not always cultural. Therefore, it is extremely important to understand 
the non-cultural aspects of these so-called “cultural” conflicts in order to 
reroute related problems back to the political sphere. These problems may be 
easier to settle in the political arena because in practice all political interests 
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could, more or less, be negotiated, while culture will take longer to change, 
particularly when its supporters feel comfortable with their own cultural 
system and values. 
Fourth, as explained in the Canadian experience, special attention has 
to be paid to religion. The problem we face in relation to religious conflicts, 
between Islam and Christianity and among Muslims themselves (the case of 
Ahmadiyah), more or less indicates the difficulties of dealing with religious 
issues at the state level. Clearly, taking side with a particular religion will 
destroy the balance that was achieved at the beginning of the republic. 
Moreover, we certainly cannot follow the Malaysian model of Malay-Muslim 
domination because our conditions are different. For one thing, the division 
between the eastern and western part of Indonesia, which runs almost parallel 
to the religious divide might motivate a “civil war” within the republic, if 
religion is used as a legally recognized political marker. 
Fifth, and the final point, we should talk about equality and equity as 
the main problems that all countries in the world have to deal with at all 
times. Under the New Order regime, Indonesia did implement its so-called 
“pemerataan” (meaning: “equality”) policy, but ironically, by so doing it 
undermined the value of justice as enshrined in the concepts of equality and 
equity. A clear example of this may be seen in the budget system of government 
institutions that allows those who work less to receive the same rewards as 
those who work harder. In this case, the principle of equality may well be 
served, but it certainly hurts our sense of justice.  
The points above are not exhaustive by any means. They are the most 
fundamental issues in relation to the proposed adoption of multiculturalism 
in Indonesia and they require our serious attention. For our own benefits, I 
hope that the discussion on multiculturalism should not end here. 
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